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yOU PLANNED A trip to Hong Kong for years. Prior
to purchasing your ticket, you noticed an advertise-
ment in the paper that offered airline tickets to Hong
Kong for half the price of the regular fare. These tickets
were "second hand." Passengers who earned frequent
flyer mileage contacted a broker to sell their unwanted
tickets. You contact the broker, purchase the "second
hand" ticket, and take-off for Hong Kong without
incident.
The flight home from Hong Kong, however, is not such
a memorable experience. The airline agent at the board-
ing gate questions your relationship to the passenger who
earned the frequent flyer pass. You hedge and finally say
that you are his "distant cousin." The agent asks you for
identification to establish your relationship with the fre-
quent flyer earner. You cannot produce any identification
to establish the relationship. The agent revokes your
ticket and you are left in Hong Kong with only the alter-
native of buying yet another ticket home at full price.
This scenario is happening more frequently to purchas-
ers of brokered tickets.' In the past, the brokering of such
tickets took place on a small scale.' In recent years, how-
l See Allen, Coupon d'etat, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1987, at 11, 12, for a discussion of the
enforcement of airline tariffs regarding illegally brokered tickets.
2 See Lezin, Call of the Wild Blue Yonder, Airlines Offer a Dizzying Array of Mileage
727
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ever, the frequent flyer black market has grown to a fifty
million dollar a year industry. The airlines are retaliating
against the brokering of the frequent flyer coupons by fil-
ing suit against the brokers as well as applying stricter
scrutiny to those who attempt to use such passes.4 The
airlines claim that brokers violate tariffs5 regulating the
use of frequent flyer coupons and interfere with business
relations.6 The brokers are responding with antitrust
counterclaims against the airlines.7
Section II of this comment discusses the airline industry
subsequent to deregulation and the emergence of the fre-
quent flyer brokering trade; Section III deals with the ar-
eas of tariff validity; Section IV pertains to interference
with business relations; and Section V discusses antitrust
actions regarding the brokering of frequent flyer coupons.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Deregulation of the Airline Industry
The airline industry, prior to January 1, 1978, operated
under a regulatory system in which airlines were required
to file tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board)."
Tariffs inconsistent with Board regulations were void. 9
Bonus Programs, L.A. LAw., Mar. 1985, at 45, 48, for a discussion of the growth of
the frequent flyer coupon brokering business.
See Allen, supra note 1, at 12.
4 Id. at 11-12 (discussing the pending suits concerning the brokering of fre-
quent flyer coupons and the enforcement of tariff regulations precluding passen-
ger use of brokered tickets); see also infra note 33 for a discussion of cases
concerning the brokering of coupons.
A tariff is defined as "[a] public document setting forth services of common
carrier being offered, . . . and governing rules, regulations and practices relating to
those services." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1306 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
1 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Platinum World Travel, 717 F. Supp. 1454 (D.
Utah 1989) (tortious interference with program contract); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1476, 1480-83, (C.D. Cal.
1988) (interference with business relations).
' See Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1484-88.
" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373 (1982). Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act re-
quired airlines, under section 1373, to file tariffs with the Board pertaining to
their "classifications, rules, regulations, practices and services in connection with
such air transportation." Id.
" See 49 U.S.C. app. § 13 7 3(a) (1982).
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Ticket agents' ° could not collect or charge amounts for
air transportation different from those which the airlines
filed with the Board in their tariffs.lI The Board governed
the relationship between the airlines and their passengers
and had primary jurisdiction over cases relating to viola-
tions of tariff regulations.' 2
The deregulation of the airline industry began in 1976
when the Board eased rate requirements and entry into
the airline industry.' 3 The purpose of deregulating the
airline industry was not only to promote competition
among the airlines but also to promote safety procedures,
fair wages, and equitable working conditions within the
air transport industry.' 4 The Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 (Act) 5 culminated the Board's efforts to deregulate
the airline industry and forced airlines to be competitive
in the market in order to survive.' 6 The Act, by eliminat-
,,, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(40) (1982). Section 1301 defines a ticket agent as
any person ... who, as principal or agent, sells or offers for sale any air transpor-
tation, or negotiates for, or holds himself out by solicitation, advertisement, or
otherwise as one who sells, provides .... or arranges for such, transportation." Id.
1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373(b) (1982).
12 Davison & Solomon, Air Carrier Liability Under Deregulation, 49J. AIR L. & COM.
31, 32-33 (1983). Additionally, the regulatory system enabled the Board to regu-
late air carrier practices that were unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory pursu-
ant to section 1482 of the Federal Aviation Act. Id. at 33; see also 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1482 (1982).
13 Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14
TRANSP. LJ. 101, 136 (1984). The Board paved the way for the deregulation of
the airline industry by allowing some automatic entry into the industry and estab-
lishing a means for airlines to form unregulated price adjustments through tariffs.
Id. at 137. The tariffs allowed individual airlines, rather than the Board, to estab-
lish their prices. The relaxed requirements increased competition among the air-
lines. See id. at 144-45.
1, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP.
No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 3737.
- Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
- See Hardaway, supra note 13, at 137. Deregulation spurred airlines to formu-
late competitive measures which were not needed under the previous regulatory
system. The result of these measures was a fifty percent increase in operating
profits just one year after the Airline Deregulation Act was enacted. The increase
in operating profits was due to more passengers flying and taking advantage of
reasonable air fares. Id. at 140. The competitive measures included a decline in
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ing the domestic rate tariff system, removed the Board's
authority to determine what constituted just and reason-
able rates and airline practices and eliminated the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction.' 7 Further, the Department
of Transportation (DOT) assumed the role of the Board
in accepting the airlines' tariffs.' 8  The Board, however,
retained control in certain traditional regulatory areas of
the aviation field.' 9 Without the Board's primary jurisdic-
tion to settle tariff disputes, courts now must look to com-
mon law 20 or statutory remedies2 ' to fill in the gaps
created by the deregulation.2 2
B. The Emergence of Frequent Flyer Coupon Brokering
With the advent of airline deregulation, airlines sought
fare rates for "no frills" flights to enable airlines to increase flight capacity and
operate more efficiently. Id. at 144.
17 Davison & Solomon, supra note 12, at 34. In addition to the Board's loss of
authority, the airlines lost the ability to disclaim their liability from, for example,
physical injuries to passengers by merely filing a tariff with the Board. Id. The
area of primary jurisdiction of the Board to determine what practices by airlines
were just or reasonable became ajudicial question and required the application of
federal common law. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc.,
682 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
Is 49 U.S.C. app. § 155 1(b) (1982 & Supp. VI 1988). Airlines are now required
to file with the DOT "tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air transpor-
tation .. .and all classifications, rules .... practices, and services in connection
with such air transportation." 14 C.F.R. § 221.3 (1989). The tariffs are required
to put the public on notice of each airline's rules, regulations and practices. See id.
If a person disagrees with a tariff provision, the individual is free to chose an
airline with different tariff terms.
11, Davison & Solomon, supra note 12, at 35. The Board retained regulatory
authority over such areas as "smoking" and "adequate service" provided by carri-
ers. Id.
21 First Pa. Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1122 (3d Cir. 1984)
(loss of shipper limited to value specified in tariffs of carrier and deregulation had
no effect on interpretation of tariff provision which is purely judicial determina-
tion). After deregulation, the validity of Eastern's tariff, limiting its liability for
items lost in shipping, became a purely judicial question to be determined by the
application of common law remedies. Id.
2' See Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1485-88 (case involving airline's suit
against coupon broker selling frequent flyer coupons and counterclaim of broker).
The court in Trans World Airlines applied provisions of the respective statute (the
Sherman Act) to the broker's antitrust claim. Id. (discussing how the common
law will fill gaps encountered after deregulation).
1'- See Davison & Solomon, supra note 12, at 46-47.
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new marketing techniques to attract passengers and com-
bat competition within the industry.2 3 One such market-
ing technique was the frequent flyer bonus (FFB) program
which enabled passengers, upon flying a certain number
of miles or flights, to receive awards in the form of free,
discounted or upgraded travel.2" Initially, airlines did not
anticipate the continuance of the FFB programs. The air-
lines anticipated that, once "brand loyalty" was estab-
lished, the programs would be discontinued. 25 Due to the
increased competition in the airline industry and the en-
trance of cut-rate airlines, however, the FFB programs
continued.26
Almost all of the major airlines offer some variation of
an FFB program. 27  The airlines regulate the programs
through tariffs, filed with the DOT, which specify the
manner in which passengers may earn and use the FFB
coupons. Tariffs are guidelines which set forth an air-
line's rules and regulations governing the relationship be-
tween the passenger and the airline.28 To accomplish the
goal of establishing "brand loyalty," most airlines will not
redeem the coupons for cash nor transfer the coupons to
- Hall, Frequent Flyer Benefits, Substantive and Procedural Tax Consequences, 20 IND.
L. REV. 823, 825 (1987). Marketing techniques, designed to "create brand loy-
alty," enabled patrons to "earn" free trips by flying on a specific airline and accru-
ing mileage. Id. at 824-25.
24 Id. at 825.
25 Id. The frequent flyer patronage would increase business in the long run for
airlines. Id.
26 Id.
27 Lezin, supra note 2, at 45-46, 48. Airlines offer FFB plans with various rules
and regulations on entry into the program and use of the FFB coupons when
earned. Such regulations specify what days the coupons can be used during the
week, specify upgrade ticket requirements, specify mileage credit for flights taken,
and specify limitation of the use of the coupons to only the FFB earner's family.
Id.
Id.2 See 14 C.F.R. § 221.3(a) (1989). Section 221.3(a) requires airlines to file tar-
iffs disclosing the rules and regulations imposed by the FFB coupons to put pas-
sengers on notice of the limitations on the use of the coupons. Id.; see also Trans
World Airlines Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1476, 1479
(C.D. Cal. 1988); infra notes 33-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
role of tariffs in the airline industry.
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other travelers.29
Passengers who earn the coupons, however, have found
an alternative means for their use. If a passenger prefers
cash, as opposed to a free or discounted air fare, the pas-
senger can sell the coupon to an independent ticket bro-
ker. The broker, in turn, sells the coupon to another
passenger at a discounted price. 0 Airlines, in response to
the phenomenal growth of the coupon brokerage busi-
ness, began policing the FFB programs for invalidly is-
sued tickets.3' If an airline determines that a coupon is
invalidly issued, the coupon will be taken from the passen-
ger prior to boarding.3 2
III. VALIDITY OF TARIFFS SUBSEQUENT TO
DEREGULATION
All airlines are required to file tariffs, open to public in-
spection, which set forth all of the practices and services
offered by the individual airline. This section will explore
the history and impact that tariffs have on carriers and
passengers and the public policy ramifications of the
tariffs.
A. Tariffs Imposed by Law
Airlines, due to the magnitude of coupon brokering, in-
itiated suits against coupon brokers claiming violations of
the tariffs filed with the DOT.3 Deregulation of the air-
- Lezin, supra note 2, at 48. Many airlines stipulate in their tariffs that coupons
are only transferable to immediate family members. Id.
-- Id. Brokering is accomplished by purchasing the coupon (usually containing
only limited transferability to the earner's family) from the passenger, contacting
a buyer for the coupon, and then registering the coupon, with the airline in the
buyer's name. in effect, the frequent flier earner designates a "distant cousin" to
appear on the coupon certificate. Id.
- See Allen, supra note 1, at 11-12. At the start of the FFB programs, airlines
did not patrol the illegal brokering of tickets because such transferring was done
on a small scale. Due to the magnitude of brokering and the fact that some bro-
kers made between $15 and $20 million per year (and others averaged $40 million
per year), airlines are enforcing the tariffs pertaining to the transferability of FFB
coupons. Id. at 11.
:12 See id.; infra notes 33-95 for a discussion regarding tariffs.
:... Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
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line industry, however, resulted in disputes over the valid-
ity of these tariffs due to the fact that deregulation
precluded the Board from making a determination of
whether a tariff is reasonable.
The first question that arises in addressing the validity
of these tariffs is whether the deregulation of the airline
industry nullified the regulatory effects of the airline tar-
iffs. For years, courts viewed a tariff set by a carrier not
merely as a contract between the carrier and its customer,
but also as a rate imposed by law.34 The carrier was
bound to charge only those rates set forth in the tariff and
in turn, was liable up to the specified transport rates con-
tained in the tariffs.35 Regardless of the external contracts
and agreements that surrounded a carrier's agreement
with its customer, the tariff was deemed conclusive and
exclusive, having the force and effect of a statute. 6 Thus,
the tariffs governed the terms of the agreements between
the airline and their customers and could not be altered
by reference to outside contracts or agreements.3
1476, 1479-80 (C.D. Cal" 1988) (airline filed suit against coupon broker for violat-
ing tariffs pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 221.3, for fraud and interference with business
relations); see also Allen, supra note 1, at 12; supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text. Cases involving coupon brokering are pending before the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California. Allen, supra note 1, at 12. But see
American Airlines, Inc. v. Platinum World Travel, 717 F. Supp. 1454, 1461-62
n.21 (D. Utah 1989) (court declined to follow the Trans World Airlines court regard-
ing the interference with business relations claim).
-4 United States v. Associated Air Transp., Inc., 275 F.2d 827, 833 (5th Cir.
1960)(carrier recovered against the government in a suit based on specific terms
contained in tariffs, properly filed by the carrier with the Board); Louisville & N.R.
Co. v. Dickerson, 191 F. 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1911) (tariffs set by railroads gov-
erning price of shipments enforced).
35 Louisville & N.R. Co., 191 F. at 709.
-, See Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560, 561 (1924) (tariffs contained implied
obligations that shipper use due diligence thus shipper held liable for failure to
abide by tariff terms); Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632, 637-38 (1916) (tariff
rules governing shipment terms bound customer to pay stipulated transport
charges); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 74-76 (1908) (ship-
pers of goods bound to conduct business according to tariffs required for regulat-
ing commerce); Associated Air Transp., 275 F.2d at 833;Jones v. Northwest Airlines,
22 Wash. 2d 863, 157 P.2d 728, 729 (1945) (passenger bound by tariff regulations
printed on ticket when ticket purchased).
:,7 Associated Air Transp., 275 F.2d at 833.
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In United States v. Associated Air Transport, Inc. ,8 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether tariffs set by air carriers had the force and effect
of statutes.3 9 Associated filed with the Board mandatory
tariffs regarding specific mileage rates charged to individ-
ual customers.4" The United States contracted with Asso-
ciated to provide air transport for military personnel
pursuant to a bidding process. 4' The bidding process re-
quired Associated to submit to the government a bid
specifying the points of origin, destination, respective
mileage of the chartered trip and the estimated dollar cost
of the bid based on that mileage.42 Associated's tariffs,
however, set a fixed charge based upon actual miles
flown.43 The government refused to pay for the mileage
flown in excess of the bid because the charges were not
set forth in the charter bid. 44 The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the tariffs were the sole standard for the
charges, regardless of the charter bidding process, and
held that the tariffs had the "force and effect of stat-
utes."'45 Thus, the government had to pay for actual mile-
age flown based on the rates set forth in Associated's
tariffs .46
Subsequent to the holding in Associated Air Transport,
Inc. ,47 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the va-
3" 275 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1960).
-I Id. at 833.
4,, Id. at 832 n.9. The tariffs defined miles to be computed according to actual
miles flown. Id.
4, Id. at 831.
42 Id. The government took the position that if miles actually flown exceeded
the bid, the bid controlled. If the miles flown were less than the bid, however, the
bid was disregarded and actual mileage costs controlled. id.
4:, Id. at 832.
44 Id at 831. Because the bid limited the cost of the contract with Associated,
the government disregarded the excess mileage actually flown. Id.
4.5 Id. at 833. Once the carrier sets forth rate changes in tariffs, the rates are
imposed by law. Id.
46 Id. at 844.
11 Id.; see also American Ry. Express v. American Trust Co., 47 F.2d 16, 18 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 629 (1931) (bank's tariffs specifying what constituted
delivery of currency to bank customer governed the liability of the bank, and the
tariffs had the force and effect of statutes).
lidity of tariffs in North American Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air
'Freight Corp.48 This case involved a claim by Emery against
North American, an air cargo shipper, for the cost of
cargo stolen in route.4 9 Tariffs, established by North
American, limited liability for negligence in shipping to
fifty cents (U.S.) per pound unless a customer declared a
higher value for the cargo. 50 The court held that the tar-
iffs set by North American determined North American's
liability to Emery in light of Emery's failure to declare a
higher value for the cargo.5'
The court also acknowledged the various ways in which
previous courts determined that tariffs were binding.52
Some courts, for example, determined that tariffs were
binding as a matter of law regardless of any terms speci-
fied by an outside contract. 53  Other courts determined
that the tariffs were binding as part of a contractual rela-
tionship between the airline and the passenger.5 4 Thus,
even if there was a contract between a passenger and an
airline regarding FFB coupons in addition to the tariff
provisions, the tariff would govern the terms of the FFB
relationship.5 5 Accordingly, regardless of the rationale a
court might use, the federal tariffs seem to govern the re-
lationship between the shipper and its customer, irrespec-
4s 579 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1978).
49 Id. at 231.
r- Id.
51 Id. at 233.
r2 Id.
• See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 572 (1921)
(telephone tariffs, limiting liability for mistakes in trainsmitting, held binding as a
matter of law); Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D. Fla.
1972), aft'd, 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973) (airline tariff regarding the loss of bag-
gage constituted the governing law, thus limiting liability for damage of articles
shipped as cargo).
.4 See Tishman & Lipp Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401, 1405 (2d Cir.
1969) (airline tariffs regulating liability for loss of luggage constituted a contract
of carriage between parties); Rosch v. United Air Lines, 146 F. Supp. 266, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (airline tariff constituted a contract of carriage between airline
and passenger limiting liability for death of animal during shipping).
r See American Airlines, Inc. v. Platinum World Travel, 717 F. Supp. 1454,
1460 (D. Utah 1989) ("A validly filed and approved tariff 'exclusively and conclu-
sively' controls contractural relations between the parties.").
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tive of the terms set forth or included in the
transportation agreements.56
The court of appeals in the North American Phillips case
also recognized that deregulation of the airline industry
eliminated the Board's ability to suspend "unjust or un-
reasonable" rates.5 7 The court delineated the suspension
of the Board's power as a separate issue, however, and
determined that such suspension did not effect the valid-
ity of tariffs which are either imposed by law or included
in a binding contract provision.5 8
The recent United States district court decision in Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc. v. Platinum World Travel and Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc. affirmed the
validity of the tariffs as controlling, for example, price,
liability of carriers, or transferability.59 Both American Air-
lines and Trans World Airlines directly addressed the issue
of whether airline tariffs, pertaining to the regulation of
FFB coupons, are valid and control the relationship be-
tween the airlines and their customers. 60 American Air-
lines and Trans World specified in their tariffs, filed with
the DOT pursuant to section 221.3, of Title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, 6' the rules and regulations
of the FFB plan coupons.62 Due to the emergence of a
• North Am. Phillips Corp., 579 F.2d at 233; see also Carter v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 1966) (tariffs establishing rates filed by telephone
companies are binding upon customers and not subject to alteration), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1008 (1967); Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 302 F.2d 709, 712 (2d
Cir.) (liability limitations set forth in tariffs are binding on shippers and passen-
gers regardless of whether terms are set forth in transportation documents), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962).
51 North Am. Phillips Corp., 579 F.2d at 234.
.,, Id.
5 American Airlines, 717 F. Supp. at 1461; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Coupon Exch., Inc:, 682 F. Supp. 1476, 1481 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
American Airlines, 717 F. Supp. at 1460; Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at
1481.
- 14 C.F.R. § 221.3 (1989).
American Airlines, 717 F. Supp. at 1459; Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at
1479. The tariffs set forth regulations governing the use of such coupons and
specifically stated that FFB awards "are non-transferable, may not be bartered,
sold, or assigned, and may be used only by the designated parties [the earner or a
designated family member, legal dependent, or relative]." Trans World Airlines,
secondary market for the coupons, the airlines filed suit
against brokers of the coupons for violating the tariffs reg-
ulating the FFB programs.6 3
The initial step the Trans World Airlines court took was to
determine the validity of the tariffs as imposed by law or
as a binding contract between the airline and their passen-
gers regardless of the airline deregulation.64 The court
looked to United States v. Edwards,65 which involved a tariff
specifying an airline's right to inspect shipments prior to
carriage, to determine whether the tariffs controlled the
relationship between the airline and its passengers. 66 The
Edwards court held the tariffs to represent "conclusive and
exclusive... rights and liabilities between airlines and their
passengers.", 67 Thus, the tariffs had the force and effect
of law. 68 Additionally, the Edwards court cited Tishman &
Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines69 to establish the validity of tar-
iffs on an alternative ground. 70 Both the Tishman and Ed-
wards courts held that the tariffs represent a contractual
relationship between the airline and its passengers.
7
'
Although both of these holdings were prior to the deregu-
lation of the airline industry, the Trans World Airlines court
made no distinction based upon the intervening
72legislation.
In sum, both the Trans World Airlines and the American
Airlines courts held that the tariffs established guidelines
682 F. Supp. at 1479. Trans World also retained the right to disqualify the use of
coupons if a violation of the tariff regulations occurred. Id.; see also American Air-
lines, 717 F. Supp. at 1461.
," American Airlines, 717 F. Supp. at 1458; Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at
1480.
- See supra notes 48-53, 56-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
validity of tariffs concerning FFB coupons.
602 F.2d 458, 462-63 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id. at 462.
67 Id. (emphasis added); Tishman & Lipp, Inc., 413 F.2d at 1403 (tariff pertaining
to an airline's liability for lost baggage upheld as regulating the rights and liabili-
ties between airlines and their passengers).
- Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481.
co 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969).
71 Edwards, 602 F.2d at 462.
71 Id. at 463; Tishman & Lipp, Inc., 413 F.2d at 1405.
7._ Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481.
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regarding the use of the FFB coupons and provided for
the FFB coupon's cancellation if any violation of the tariffs
occurred.73 The deregulation of the airline industry re-
sulted in the elimination of set rates industry-wide. 4 In
contrast, FFB terms defined within the tariffs filed by indi-
vidual airlines are valid under the federal filing statute.75
Hence, case law, prior and subsequent to the Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978, has upheld the validity of tariffs
regulating the FFB coupons.76
B. Validity of a Tariff in Terms of Public Policy
Even though tariffs are valid as imposed by law or on
the basis of a contractual relationship, the tariff will be in-
validated if it is against public policy. 77 For example, tar-
iffs which exempt a common carrier from all liability for
the negligence of the carrier are against public policy and
are void.78 Another concern is whether the application of
primary jurisdiction, 79 which gives deference to tariffs in-
stead of applying applicable state law, is against public
policy. 80 This question arises in the FFB coupon context
73 American Airlines, 717 F. Supp. at 1459-61 (case remanded for further pro-
ceedings); Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481.
71 See supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deregula-
tion of the airline industry.
75 See supra notes 18 and 28 and accompanying text specifying the tariff report-
ing requirements imposed on airlines.
7,1 First Pa. Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1122 (3d Cir. 1984)
(deregulation of airline industry merely deprived Board of its power to determine
the reasonableness of tariffs (doctrine of primary jurisdiction)); see supra notes 33-
75 and accompanying text for a discussion of case law regulation of the airline/
passenger relationship.
77 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1476, 1481 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
71 Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977). The
validity of the tariff limiting liability for the death of an animal during transport
was a question of public policy. The public policy determination of the validity of
a tariff ultimately is a judicial question requiring the application of federal com-
mon law. Id. at 1313.
71, Id. Primary jurisdiction, in the context of airline tariffs required to be filed
with the DOT under federal statute, furthers the rationale of public disclosure of
individual airline regulations rather than burden judicial resources with dispute
settlements. Id.; see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
, Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481.
because airline tariffs, which prevent the transfer of the
coupons, preclude the assignment of a contract right
which is a matter of state law.8 '
Coupon brokers claim that a passenger contracts with
the airline for the frequent flyer miles when purchasing
regular fare tickets.82 The passenger, upon earning the
miles necessary to receive the FFB coupons, performs one
hundred percent of his contract, thus gaining the right to
assign the coupons regardless of the tariffs on file with the
DOT prohibiting such acts.83 This argument assumes that
brokers rely on state law, which often provides that non-
negotiable instruments (such as FFB coupons) are assign-
able. 84 The question then becomes whether the tariffs, re-
quired under federal statute, preempt state law and
whether such preemption violates public policy?
On one hand, airline tariffs, assuming they are just and
reasonable, are required to be filed under federal law and
represent not a mere contract right but have the force of
law.8 5 Section 1305 of the Federal Aviation Act protects
tariffs by preempting state law.8 6 Courts interpreting sec-
tion 1305 have held that Congressional intent was to pre-
empt both state statutes and all common law rules
8' Id.
H' Allen, supra note 1, at 12.
83 Id.
s4 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481. The brokers relied on the
California Civil Code section 1459, which provides that non-negotiable instru-
ments such as the FFB coupons are assignable, to argue that the preclusion of the
FFB coupon transfer was a violation of public policy and, thus, the tariffs were
invalid. Id.
- Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967); see also supra notes 18-22, 28 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the tariff requirements imposed on individual airlines.
49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 1305 states:
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency
or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter [49
U.S.C. § 1371] to provide air transportation.
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affecting rates and services of air travel.87 They hold that
Congress intended to preempt both state law and com-
mon law in order to do away with "uncertainties and con-
flicts [in air travel], including situations in which carriers
have been required to charge different fares for passen-
gers traveling between two cities .... 88 Thus, Congress
regulates the aviation industry extensively. Through tar-
iffs filed with the DOT, and under section 1305(a), it
preempts any state statute causing a variation of airline
rates from one state to another.8 0
Even though the passenger earns the right to use the
frequent flyer coupon, section 1305(a) preempts any state
law allowing for the assignment of such coupons.90
Hence, the tariffs filed pursuant to this Act do not violate
public policy, as evidenced by the legislative history9' and
case law.9 2 The tariffs are a valid means by which the air-
lines can regulate the FFB plans. 3
In addition to section 1305, the Commerce Clause may
provide grounds for federal preemption of state law.94
The Commerce Clause will be addressed in Section V of
11 See Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (failure of air-line to seat a blind person near emergency exit did not give rise to a state law
action because section 1305 preempts all laws relating to service); Hingson v.Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1984) (state law re-garding discrimination claim of passenger preempted by section 1305 even if the
state law in question does not conflict with federal law); New York Airlines, Inc. v.Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1441-43 (D. Mass. 1985) (refusal of airport to
allow airline access was preempted by section 1305 in order to assure uniformity
in the federal regulation of the airline industry).
I" H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3737, 3751-52.
11, Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, 682 F. Supp. 378, 379 (N.D.
11. 1988) (Illinois statute and common law pertaining to ability of travel agent to
charge rates different than prescribed in airline tariffs were preempted by section
1305(a) of the Federal Aviation Act).
See Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history regarding tariff preemption of state law.
1"2 See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the preemption of
both state law and common law regarding tariffs.
1" Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1481.
'" Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM.1001, 1003-04 (1980). Congress, through the Commerce Clause, Article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution, places maximum reliance on the antitrust laws to insure
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this comment, which pertains to the antitrust impact of
precluding the brokering of FFB coupons.95
IV. BROKER'S INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS
This section will discuss the scope of the tort of inter-
ference with business relations, and the elements of the
tort as provided for under various state laws. The tort of
interference with business relations (also called interfer-
ence with contractual relations) is a developing tort, the
elements of which are vague and the applications of which
are difficult to predict.9 6
A. Scope of Interference with Business Relations
Although tariffs are one valid means of precluding the
brokering of FFB coupons, 9 7 as an additional tactic the
airlines can also bring suit against FFB coupon brokers
for the tort of interference with business relations.98 In an
action for interference with business relations, a plaintiff
brings suit against a person or entity for interfering with a
contract or business relationship between the plaintiff and
competitive market, provide safe and efficient transportation, and prevent unfair
practices in the air transport industry. Id.
' See infra notes 139-223 and accompanying text for a discussion of the anti-
trust claims regarding FFB coupons.
w" A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Professional Ins., Inc., 27 Cal. App. 3d 710, 714,
104 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (1972) (broker's claim of wrongful interference with busi-
ness relations stated a prima facie cause of action against the insurance company);
see also Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. App. 3d 815, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748, 537
P.2d 865, 868 (1975). The tort of interference with contractual relations dates
back to 1853 but is infrequently invoked in tort actions. Id.; Idlehour Dev. Co. v.
City of St. Charles, 88 111. App. 3d 47,409 N.E.2d 544, 548 (1980) (cause of action
for interference with contractor's business relations against city sufficient to state
claim in field of new tort); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 comment b
(1977). This tort is not defined by specific rules and often depends on whether
the particular interests at issue merit a cause of action. The decision as to whether
the interference was improper, therefore, depends upon a factual analysis and
"choice of values in each situation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767
comment b (1977).
1,7 See supra notes 33-93 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning the
validity of tariffs set by individual airlines.
!m Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc. 682 F. Supp.
1476, 1482-83 (D.C. Cal. 1988). But see American Airlines, Inc. v. Platinum World
Travel, 717 F. Supp. 1454, 1461-62 n.21 (D. Utah 1989).
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a third party. 99 In some cases, a valid cognizable relation-
ship need not even exist to bring a claim, but only an
agreement in principle.'0 0 A claimant may prevail by
showing that a party interfered with prospective or poten-
tial business relations.' 0 '
Interference with business relations 0 2 is recognized by
many courts and commentators and is often supported by
public policy arguments. 0 3 The public policy arguments
regarding the tort generally recognize the economic value
of contractual and business relationships and seek to dis-
courage deceptive and underhanded competition. 0 4 The
tort is a state specific tort requiring analysis of the ration-
.. See F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.5, at 300-02 (2d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAw OF TORTS]. The tort of interference of contractual
relations protects the integrity of contractual relations into which the plaintiff en-
tered with the contracting party. Id. at 302.
"- See Buckaloo, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 537 P.2d at 868-
69. A valid contract is not a requirement to bring a claim of interference with
business relations because the essence of the claim is a disruption of a relationship
and not the breach of a contract. Id. at 749, 537 P.2d at 869.
I Id.
.... See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977). Section 766 states:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the perform-
ance of a contract ... between another and a third person by induc-
ing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the
contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss re-
sulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform
the contract.
Id.; see also id. § 767 comment a. Further, the interference must be intentional and
improper in order to substantiate a claim of interference with business relations.
See id.
"I See Buckaloo, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52, 537 P.2d at
871; A.F. Arnold, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 716, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 100; Venturini v. Af-
fatato, 84 Ill. App. 3d 547, 405 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (1980) (interference with real
estate purchase sufficient to substantiate interference with business relations
claim); Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1941)
(purchaser prevailed on a claim of interference with a noncompetition contract on
the grounds that the interference was against public policy and that such acts were
unlawful); Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (inter-
ference with employee relations by outside employer was sufficient to establish an
interference with business relations claim).
"'4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 comment f (1977). To determine if
the interference was improper, the social interests advanced by the interference
must be taken into consideration. If the motivation behind the interference was to
promote a public interest, such as precluding a contract agreement which would
pollute the environment, the interference would probably not constitute a tort in
violation of section 766. Id.
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ale applicable to the respective state law where the claim
is brought. 10 5 For example, both California and Illinois
recognize that competition in the market place is
needed 10 6 but that the tort of interference with business
relations acts as a check on dealings which ultimately dis-
rupt contractual or prospective relationships. 0 7 Courts in
Illinois weigh the contractual interest at stake against the
challenged conduct to determine whether the acts in
question should be prohibited. 0 8
New York courts, on the other hand, view the business
or contractual agreement as a "property right."' 0 9 Courts
weigh the public gain against the harm incurred from the
interference to determine whether an interference with
business relations is merited." 0  If improper means, such
as dishonest, unfair, or harmful actions, are not used in
the interference, an actionable claim does not exist."'
Finally, Texas courts suggest that parties should induce
breach or interference of a contractual 'relationship when
the contracts are no longer economically optimal." 2 The
See generally LAw Or TORTS, supra note 99, at 304-08.
See DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1347 n.3 (9th
Cir.) (broker's suit for tortious interference with business relations failed because
of failure on broker's part to establish an economic or business relationship), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 869 (1980); Mitchell v. Weiger, 56 111. App. 3d 236, 371 N.E.2d
888, 892 (1977) (innocent contracting party, to protect his rights in contract, has
right of action in tort against interfering party).
1,,7 See Imperial Ice Co., 18 Cal. 2d at 33, 112 P.2d at 633; Idlehour Dev. Co., 88 Ill.
App. 3d at 47, 409 N.E.2d at 548.
,, Idlehour Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d at 47, 409 N.E.2d at 548.
1m, Strapex Corp. v. Metaverpa N.V., 607 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(distributer suit against salesman and manufacturer for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage); Sommer v. Kaufman, 59 A.D.2d 843, 844, 399
N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (App. Div. 1977) (interference with one's business relations is not
actionable unless unlawful means are implemented).
.. Strapex Corp., 607 F. Supp. at 1050; ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 454, 459, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867 (1977) (court
weighed packager's harm from interference with business sales against public
need to be informed about harmful products).
1 Sommer, 59 A.D.2d at 844, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 8; see also Royal Soc'y of Medicine
v. International Soc'y for Preventive Oncology, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 794, 797
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (tort of malicious interference involving a "wrongful threat pre-
cluding the exercise of free will" constitutes improper conduct to establish liabil-
ity from tort).
112 See State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 688 (Tex.
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courts allow interference provided that some legitimate
interest is furthered and that no unlawful means are used
to advance such interests." 13
B. Elements of Interference with Business Relations
The determination of whether a broker is in fact guilty
of interfering with the relationship between an airline and
its passengers requires analysis of each element in light of
the broker's purpose, motive, and intent for brokering the
coupons.
The elements of interference with business relations
vary from state to state. In New York and California, a
contract need not be present for an interference, only an
economic relationship.' 4 Texas and Illinois, however, re-
quire an existing contract to be present." t5 A contractual
relationship could be presumed between an airline and its
passengers when the passenger purchases a ticket from
the airline."16 Passenger agreement to the tariff provi-
sions, which represents an offer, is assumed under Cali-
fornia law, and possibly in New York, upon acceptance of
the ticket or the earned FFB coupon."' 7 Courts in Texas
and Illinois, however, might not recognize such an agree-
ment as equating to an existing contract between an air-
line and its passengers. Thus, the initial question of the
existence of a contract might preclude an interference
with business relations claim against an FFB broker if the
state where the claim is brought does not recognize an
Ct. App. 1984) (evidence sufficient to establish unlawful means used to interfere
with business relations and a cause of action).
,,1 Id. One is entitled to interfere with business relations if one has bona fide
rights in or possesses an equal or superior interest to that of the plaintiff. The
interest, financial or otherwise, must be of the interfering party and the interfer-
ing party may not violate definite legal rights of others.
",4 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1476, 1482 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Sommer v. Kaufman, 59 A.D.2d 843, 844, 399
N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (App. Div. 1977).
- Venturini v. Affatato, 84 I11. App. 3d 547, 405 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (1980);
Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
"; See Allen, supra note 1, at 12.
,,7 See United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1979); Trans World
Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1479; Sommer, 59 A.D.2d at 844, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
implied contractual relationship as an existing contract." 18
The second element of the interference tort in both
California and Illinois is the broker's knowledge of the re-
lationship between the airline and its passenger (assuming
Illinois recognizes that a contractual relationship is pres-
ent).1 9 Such knowledge on the part of the broker is evi-
denced when the broker, upon procuring an FFB coupon
from a passenger, instructs the client purchasing the cou-
pon to instruct the airline that the client is a "distant
cousin" of the passenger who earned the coupon. 120 Such
evidence should easily establish the second element:
knowledge of the relationship between the airline and its
customers.
New York, Illinois, Texas, and California all recognize
as an element of the tort either: (1) intentional interfer-
ence or inducement to breach a contract or (2) an agree-
ment resulting in damages. 12 The intentional
interference could be shown by establishing that the bro-
kers, upon selling the coupons, preclude paying custom-
ers from a seat on the plane, thus damaging the airlines by
procuring revenue indirectly and interfering with the tariff
relationship that prohibits coupon transfers. 22 Additional
elements required to establish a tort claim in New York
include interference (1) without excuse and (2) by an un-
lawful act.12 3 Texas requires that the interference proxi-
mately cause the airlines' damages.
24
I[- See Venturini, 84 Il. App. 3d at 547, 405 N.E.2d at 1098; Champion, 740
S.W.2d at 853.
,1, Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1483; Venturini, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 547,
405 N.E.2d at 1098.
12-" See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the coupon bro-
ker's procedure for selling FFB coupons.
12, Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1483; Venturini, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 547,
405 N.E.2d at 1098; Sommer, 59 A.D.2d at 844, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 8; Champion, 740
S.W.2d at 853.
1-"- A valid agreement, in this case the airline tariffs precluding the sale or trans-
fer of FFB coupons, must be in force in order to claim interference with a business
or contractual relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment f
(1977).
12.. Sommer, 59 A.D.2d at 844, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
124 Champion, 740 S.W.2d at 853.
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This interference might not warrant a tort claim in
courts similar to New York's which might take the view
that the interference is not unlawful since the airline tariff
agreement is not a "property right" meriting protec-
tion. 25 Furthermore, courts could view the passenger as
having a "property right" to sell the earned FFB coupons
to the brokers. 26  Under this view, the passenger per-
forms one hundred percent of his contractual obligations
to the airline when the passenger purchases and pays for
the tickets. 27 The passenger could then assign the cou-
pon rights earned from the tickets to the broker. 28
Courts, however, rejected this line of reasoning in light of
the airline tariff's continued validity subsequent to dereg-
ulation and the preemption of state law or common law
under section 1305 of the Federal Aviation Act. 129
Courts following the Texas approach might allow the
interference if the selling of FFB coupons was beneficial
in promoting the economic interest of the brokers and the
public gain of inexpensive air fare with only incidental
harm to the airlines. 30 The airlines, however, could try to
establish that the resulting loss of revenues, increased ne-
cessity to police the coupon program, and loss of passen-
ger loyalty result in more costs than benefits and, thus,
merit an interference with business relations claim.' 31
The recent California case of Trans World Airlines v.
American Coupon Exchange, Inc., discussed previously, ad-
dressed the issue of whether a broker interfered with the
contractual relations between the airlines and their cus-
"-.1 Cf ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 459, 368 N.E.2d 1230,
1233, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867 (1977). New York courts might conclude that the
public gain of inexpensive fares obtained from brokered tickets outweighs the
harm incurred by the airlines. Id.
"-"1 See Allen, supra note 1, at 12.
127 Id.
12. Id.
"-1 See supra notes 33-93 and accompanying text for a discussion on the validity
of airline tariffs.
'-1" See State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 688
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
"I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comments j, k (1977).
tomers by brokering FFB coupons. 32 The court held that
a contractual relationship existed between the airlines and
their passengers with respect to the FFB coupons. 33 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that American Coupon Ex-
change knew of this relationship and intended to interfere
by brokering the coupons.' 3 4 The profit derived from the
sale of the coupons motivated the brokers to interfere
with Trans World's relationship with their customers. 35
The court did not accept American Coupon Exchange's
only defense that the brokering of the coupons, in viola-
tion of Trans World's tariffs, was not wrongful and that
no actionable claim existed.13 6 The court determined that
American Coupon Exchange acted intentionally and for
pecuniary gains which did not promote any goals except
its own. 137
In light of the Trans World Airlines holding, it appears
that a broker who violates an airline's tariff precluding the
sale or transfer of FFB coupons will be liable under Cali-
fornia law for interfering with the business relations of the
airline. 38 Other jurisdictions, however, might not reach
the same result as the Trans World Airlines court due to
state differences regarding the elements of the tort and
analyses of these elements.
V. THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF FREQUENT FLYER
COUPON BROKERING
The airlines' recent success in the interference with
business relations claims and the validity of tariffs against
FFB coupon brokers have provided a steady deterrent
precluding brokers from selling the coupons. The bro-
32 Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1482.
-,:, Id. at 1481.
1:,4 Id. at 1483. The broker admitted to knowledge of the relationship between
the airline and passenger set forth in the tariffs precluding the transfer of cou-
pons. Id.
Id.
Id. The court held the broker's activity of selling the FFB coupons disrupted
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kers, however, have also attempted to defend the sale of
the coupons by asserting antitrust claims against the air-
lines. 39 Section A will discuss the effect of airline deregu-
lation on antitrust claims; Section B will explore Section
One of the Sherman Act pertaining to the brokering of
FFB coupons; and Section C will discuss Section Two of
the Sherman Act and the coupon brokerage business.
A. The Antitrust Claim Subsequent to Deregulation
Prior to deregulation, the Board reviewed the activities
of airlines to ensure that competition was not carried to
an extreme and that the safety of air transportation was
not jeopardized. 4 0 The Board allowed competition only
to the extent necessary for developing a financially sound
airline industry and even precluded antitrust claims for
specific types of transactions.' 4 ' This antitrust immunity,
however, was illusory, as evidenced by the 1945 decision
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad which subjected carrier
activity in the railroad industry to the scrutiny of antitrust
laws. 4 2 This early holding recognized that regulated in-
dustries, such as the airline industry, are not per se exempt
from antitrust laws.' 43 Whether a regulated industry is
free from an antitrust claim depends on the presence of
one of the following conditions: (1) an express statutory
exemption specifically excluding a particular activity from
antitrust scrutiny; (2) implied immunity inferred from a
regulatory statute when those competitive activities are
1'1' See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1476, 1484-88 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Allen, supra note 1, at 11-12.
'4" Beane, supra note 94, at 1002. The Board was also supposed to insure cer-
tainty in the airline industry by regulating fares and entry into the air transporta-
tion service industrywide. id.
14, Id. at 1002-03. The immunity granted by the Board from antitrust claims
lessened competition among airlines in order to assure the sound development of
the airline industry. Id. at 1003. An example of the immunity granted from the
Board might have been the allowance of two airlines to enter into a contract that
precluded another airline from participating in a certain area of the aviation
industry.
'1 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945) (regulated railroad
industry subject to antitrust laws for rate-fixing combinations).
1'4: See id.
consistent with the statute in question; (3) immunity
under the filed tariff doctrine evidenced by Congress's in-
tent to preclude antitrust action in conjunction with the
mandated tariffs; or (4) state action immunity prescribed
when states are allowed to regulate antitrust claims in cer-
tain areas. 144
Subsequent to the deregulation of the airline indus-
try, 14 5 the availability of antitrust immunity was severely
limited, if not extinguished. 46 Under deregulation, air-
lines are forced to compete in the market place and satisfy
consumer needs in order to retain a share of the mar-
ket.' 47 The public, after airline deregulation, expected
greater affordability and improved convenient airline ser-
vice. This public expectation forced airlines to adopt new
competitive rates and services without Board approval. 14
Thus, airlines incorporated aggressive rate structures and
entered into vertical agreements with ticket agents to im-
plement the competitive rates.1 49 Additionally, airline re-
porting agencies, which act as clearing houses between
the airlines and ticket agents, were incorporated to facili-
tate the reporting and remitting of airline fares between
individual airlines and prospective travel agencies who
were permitted to sell the airline tickets. 150
144 Joseph, Private Antitrust Litigation Involving Regulated Industries, 53 ANTITRUST
L.J. 193, 193-200 (1984). Even though courts do not favor antitrust immunity,
there are areas in which immunity does exist. Id. at 193.
145 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C. § 1301).
146 See Joseph, supra note 144, at 203.
47 See Bois, Deregulation in Practice, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 189 (1986). Regula-
tion of industry activities seemed to foster decreased emphasis on competition
and innovation in order to retain and promote customer satisfaction. Id.
14. See Cohen, Emerging Problems for Future Deregulators, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 185,
186-87 (1984); see also Joseph, supra note 144, at 203.
141. DeMuth, Deregulation Review, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 191 (1984). Since de-
regulation, the Board removed the barrier between airline and ticket agents creat-
ing vertical relationships subject to antitrust claims. Id.
,r- See T. DICKERSON, TRAVEL INDUSTRY PROBLEMS TRAVEL LITIGATION, TERROR-
ISM DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 190-91 (1987). The reporting
agency business initially emerged to ward off antitrust claims. The reporting
agency supervises travel agencies nationwide regarding weekly sales reporting
and acts as a clearing house between the airline and travel agency in the collection
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In sum, the deregulation of the airline industry put
maximum emphasis on competition between airlines to
encourage quality service at a reasonable price.' 5' Com-
petition must be in the public interest, however, and the
antitrust statutes ensure that the airlines do not monopo-
lize the market and restrain trade. 152 Moreover, the air-
lines' defense of immunity from antitrust claims is
virtually nonexistent due to the deregulation of the
industry. 153
B. Section One Violations of the Sherman Act Regarding the
Brokering of FFB Coupons
1. Background of Section One of the Sherman Act
Section One of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . ." is ille-
gal and constitutes a violation of the Act.' 4 Although
every contract restrains trade in some fashion, only unrea-
sonable restraints violate the Act.'55 The anticompetitive
effects must harm not only the plaintiff claiming a Section
One antitrust violation but also the relevant market. 56
process of fares booked through the travel agency. Instead of the airlines dealing
directly with the travel agents, the reporting agencies act as a buffer between the
airlines and ticket agents, thus diminishing the possibility for a conspiracy claim
under the Sherman Act. Id.
1.' See Beane, supra note 94, at 1003-04.
152~ Id.
- Id. at 1009. The Board retains authority to decide whether foreign pooling
and transport agreements are adverse to public interests. Id; see supra note 146
and accompanying text for a discussion of airline immunity from antitrust actions
subsequent to deregulation.
15 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Act further states that: "[e]very person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, ... in the
discretion of the court." Id.
'.1 See Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo v. Fiat Distrib., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.) (au-
tomobile dealer's claim alleging antitrust violations dismissed for lack of establish-
ing anticompetitive practices on the part of automotive distributor and other
dealer), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
... See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.
1984) (antitrust violation involving a car manufacturer's termination of a car
transport company's contract), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985).
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Certain types of activities are considered so anticompe-
titive that courts presume the acts to be per se illegal.' 57
Examples of per se illegal activities include horizontal or
vertical price fixing, horizontal market division, horizontal
or vertical group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal,
and tying arrangements.15 8
If the activity in question does not fall within theseper se
illegal categories, courts evaluate the Section One claims
under the rule of reason test.' 59 The elements required to
establish a rule of reason claim are: (1) an agreement be-
tween two or more people or businesses; (2) the agree-
ment intends to harm or to unreasonably restrain trade;
and (3) the agreement actually harms competition in the
"relevant market."' 60 Under the rule of reason test, the
plaintiff must establish the relevant market in which com-
petition is unreasonably restrained or harmed in order to
make an actionable antitrust claim.1 6'
2. Horizontal per se Restraints on FFB Coupon Trade
Horizontal agreements among airline carriers are un-
likely due to the fact that individual airlines establish fre-
quent flyer programs to develop their own "brand
loyalty" and that the tariffs pertaining to the terms of the
FFB coupons dispell the need for carriers to conspire on
the horizontal level. Additionally, any restraint of trade,
whether on a horizontal or vertical level, that fixes, raises,
,57 Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork Inc., 710 F.2d 1366,
1370 (9th Cir. 1983). The per se illegal activities are deemed to restrain competi-
tion unreasonably and lack any redeeming virtues f6r the court to consider. Id.;
see also Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) (ac-
tivities which are per se illegal do not merit inquiry of harm caused or business
justification).
,.5 Car Carriers, Inc., 745 F.2d at 1108; Cascade Cabinet Co., 710 F.2d at 1370;
Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1979) (antitrust claim
against computer manufacturer dismissed for failure to establish a relevant mar-
ket), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980).
... Cascade Cabinet Co., 710 F.2d at 1373. Under the rule of reason approach, the
factfinder must decide whether, considering all of the circumstances of the case,
the restrictive practice unreasonably restrains competition. Id. at 1370.
"d.; Kaplan, 611 F.2d at 290.
Kaplan, 611 F.2d at 291.
1990]
752 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
lowers or stabilizes prices is illegal per se.' 6 2  Since FFB
coupons are not priced, and thus cannot be fixed, a claim
of price fixing is inapplicable. Further, individual airlines
distribute FFB coupons nationally and internationally.
Thus, the airlines do not participate in horizontal market
division agreements. 163
A claim that the airlines establish tying arrangements 64
is also inapplicable because the airlines do not coerce pas-
sengers to purchase regular priced tickets in order to re-
ceive the FFB coupons. 65 The coupons are gratuitously
given to the passenger for patronizing the airline. The
passengers individually decide if the coupons are to be
used for future air travel.
A group boycott, however, either horizontally among
competing airlines or vertically between an individual air-
line and its respective reporting agency, could constitute a
valid antitrust claim. 166 Although airlines have the right
to deal with travel agents of their choice, 67 they cannot
agree or conspire among themselves to suppress competi-
tion between travel agents or brokers of FFB coupons. 68
The brokers, however, have the burden of defining a rele-
"2 Beane, supra note 94, at 1015. A horizontal relationship is one in which
competitors are at the same level such as competing manufacturers. A vertical
relationship exists between two entities at different levels of the market structure
such as a manufacturer and a retailer. Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo v. Fiat Distrib.,
637 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
1"' See Beane, supra note 94, at 1015. A horizontal market division occurs when
competitors agree among themselves to restrain trade by dividing their respective
market among themselves. Id.
I- Beane, supra note 94, at 1015-16. A tying arrangement exists when a seller
conditions a sale of a product or service (tying product) on the purchase of a
separate product or service (tied product) and assuming the seller has sufficient
economic power to restrain or raise the price of the tied product. Id.
-1 Distributors of goods or services have the prerogative to deal and distribute
their goods or services as they see fit absent anticompetitive motives. See Ron
Tonkin Gran Turismo, 637 F.2d at 1383-84; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1476, 1485-86 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
"ll; See Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITTF Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 641-42(10th Cir. 1987); Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, 637 F.2d at 1383-84.
,f7 See Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, 637 F.2d at 1383.
'" See Key Fin. Planning Corp., 828 F.2d at 640.
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vant market' 69 and to prove a conspiracy among compet-
ing airlines to establish a viable claim.' 7 0
Proving the existence of an agreement between two or
more competing airlines to expel the FFB brokers from
the coupon market would be a difficult endeavor for the
brokers. Each airline establishes its own FFB program in
order to promote "brand loyalty" for its airline serv-
ices. 7 ' The incentive for airlines to conspire regarding
their FFB coupon program is minimal because the pro-
grams are targeted at passenger retention, and not at
competitive pricing.' 72 In the alternative, however, the
brokers could claim that the airlines conspired to prevent
the brokers from selling the frequent flyer coupons in sec-
ondary markets. The incentive for the airlines to conspire
on this basis is, once again, also low because the airline
tariffs preclude the sale or transfer of the coupons. 173
In sum, the claim of a group boycott between compet-
ing airlines is the most plausible per se violation. 74 If a
broker can establish (1) a relevant market for the broker-
ing of frequent flyer coupons (the difficulties of which will
be discussed in more detail in a claim under Section Two
of the Sherman Act17 5), (2) the existence of an agreement
between the airlines precluding the brokers from selling
the coupons, and (3) the purpose for such an agreement,
a Section One per se violation might prevail.' 76 Applying a
per se rule to a group boycott claim regarding the broker-
ing of FFB coupons might be unwarranted, however, be-
cause courts have not had sufficient experience to address
1w, See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the estab-
lishment of a relevant market.
171 See Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, 637 F.2d at 1383-84.
171 See supra notes 16, 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose
of FFB plan programs.
172 Id.
,71 See supra notes 18, 27-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of tariff
filing requirements and the regulations pertaining to the FFB coupons.
174 See supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding
horizontal group boycotts of FFB coupons.
'7r, See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the
difficulties of establishing a relevant market.
171 Id.
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the effect of the relationship between the airlines and the
brokers. 77
3. Vertical Restraints of the FFB Coupon Trade
A vertical restraint of trade can be either a per se viola-
tion, such as price fixing, group boycotts, or concerted re-
fusals to deal, or a violation that is analyzed under the rule
of reason approach. The rule of reason approach re-
quires the factfinder to decide whether, under all circum-
stances of the case, the alleged practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition. This approach
should be used in vertical relationships because in-
trabrand restraints (restraints within a brand of products)
might have a competitive effect on interbrand competition
(restraints between brands of products). Since airlines
and reporting agencies maintain a vertical relationship,
and the per se offenses of price fixing or group boycotts
between the airlines and their reporting agent is unlikely
in light of the reporting agencies' regulatory nature, the
relationship would most likely be analyzed under the rule
of reason approach. 78
Association of Retail Travel Agents, Ltd. v. Air Transport Asso-
ciation of America '79 addressed the issue of whether the re-
lationship between an airline and its reporting agency
warranted a rule of reason analysis for an antitrust viola-
tion of Section One of the Sherman Act.18 0 The Airlines
Reporting Corporation (ARC), the reporting agency, fa-
cilitated the sale of tickets between the airline and travel
agents. 8 ' Travel agents applied to ARC in order to be
,77 Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1486. A per se illegality rule is applied
only after courts have had considerable experience with the relationship in ques-
tion. Id.
,7, See id. The per se illegality rule should not automatically be applied to a
group boycott when the relationship is vertical in nature. Id.; see also Ron Tonkin
Gran Turismo v. Fiat Distrib., 637 F.2d 1376, 1383-84, 1386-87 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
17!, 623 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1985).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
Association of Retail Travel Agents Ltd., 623 F. Supp. at 894. ARC calculates the
"listed" as a recognized travel agent. 8 2 Upon listing, the
travel agents then became authorized to deal with airlines
which employed ARC; however, an airline could techni-
cally refuse to deal with a travel agent.' 83 ARC collected
airline fares sold by the travel agents and remitted the
proceeds to the respective airline.18 4
The travel agents in Association of Retail Travel claimed
that ARC's payment terms, which required weekly docu-
mentation of airline ticket sales in order to assess the
amount of sales due to each respective airline, was a per se
violation of Section One of the Sherman Act because the
terms had the effect of fixing prices paid for ticket sales. 8 5
The court determined that ARC did in fact have a uniform
pricing and reporting program with which the travel
agents were required to comply. 8 6 The court did not ap-
ply the per se rule to the uniform pricing requirements of
ARC, however, because ARC's function was to collect air-
line fares from the agents and to protect the airlines from
the risk of nonpayment by the travel agencies. 8 7 The
program of ARC was anticompetitive but had redeeming
values facilitating the efficient sale of airline tickets. 88
Even though Association of Retail Travel involved a claim
of monopolization, the role of ARC is analogous to the
vertical relationship between an airline and its reporting
agency. The reporting agency, in a vertical relationship
with an airline, promotes efficiency by training travel
agents to competently sell air transportation and by de-
signing a computerized reporting system for travel agents
amount due from each travel agent and the amount owed to each airline and dis-
tributes the payments accordingly. Id.
1I2 Id. To be listed With ARC, each agent must file an application to demon-
strate financial stability. Id.
Id.
'4 Id.
115 Id. at 896. If the agents deviated from the airlines' "suggested" price, re-
ported weekly to ARC, the agent might be removed from ARC's listing. Id.
1- Id. at 902. The reporting system did have the effect of stabilizing prices
which could constitute price fixing. Id.
1.7 Id.
'" See id. at 900, 902. The reporting system helps the airline industry operate
smoothly and increase financial stability. Id.
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to report sales and remit proceeds from the sales. 89 The
reporting agency also ensures that travel agents comply
with the airline tariffs. 9 ' Thus, the reporting agency's
role of overseeing compliance of airline tariffs leads to
reasonable enforcement of a federal statute which, in turn
promotes competition. In short, even though the airlines
and reporting agencies agree as to the pricing and terms
of airline ticket sales, such an agreement would probably
not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Furthermore, in light of the third element of the rule of
reason, it is unlikely that a broker's Section One antitrust
claim would withstand judicial scrutiny. The third ele-
ment of the rule of reason test is that competition must be
harmed in the relevant market in some fashion, as opposed
to individual market participants being harmed.' 9' A Sec-
tion One violation of the Sherman Act requires injury to
the market because the antitrust law's purpose is to pro-
tect competition. 92  An individual broker's preclusion
from the market does not constitute harm. Furthermore,
a broker must establish the market from which he is pre-
cluded. 93 Since the sale of FFB coupons takes place in a
black market, courts would probably refrain from enforc-
ing such antitrust claims on the grounds of public
policy. 9 4
.... See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (clearinghouse established by music producers was essential for market
efficiency and competition).
'1 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1476, 1484 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (describing functions the reporting agency under-
takes for the airline ensuring tariff compliance).
... See Car Carriers Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985). The antitrust laws protect competition,
not individual market participants. Id.
See id. ("[It is the function of § 1 to compensate the unfortunate only when
their demise is accompanied by a generalized injury to the market." (emphasis ad-
ded)); see also supra text accompanying notes 160-161 for the elements required to
establish an antitrust claim under the rule of reason.
Id. Car Carriers, Inc., 745 F.2d at 1109.
Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1487.
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C. Monopoly Power of the Airlines Regarding FFB Coupons
FFB coupon brokers could defend their practice of sell-
ing the coupons, regulated by airline tariffs, by asserting
an antitrust claim of monopolization of the FFB coupon
market against the airlines. 9 5 Section Two of the Sher-
man Act applies to the unilateral conduct of a corporation
or a person who monopolizes or attempts to monopolize
a relevant geographic or product market.' 96
The Sherman Act's purpose is to ensure that consumers
receive the benefits of price competition by protecting
economic freedom among participants in the market. 197
Monopolization consists of monopoly power for the pur-
pose of eliminating competition in the relevant market
and a willful acquisition or maintenance of such power, as
opposed to attaining power as a consequence of develop-
ing a successful business venture or superior product.1 9 8
In order for coupon brokers to prevail on an antitrust
claim against the airlines for monopolizing the FFB cou-
pon market, the brokers must establish that the airline
has: "1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market; 2) willful acquisition [or] maintenance of that
power; and 3) causal 'antitrust' injury." 199
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section two of the Sherman Act states:
[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on con-
viction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation .... in the discretion of the court.
Id.
See Beane, supra note 94, at 1016.
197 Brian Clewer, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 674 F. Supp. 782, 786 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (travel agency claimed antitrust violations against airline for predatory
pricing of tickets) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 538 (1983)).
,'" Beane, supra note 94, at 1016.
Trans World Airlines Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1476, 1487 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp.,
698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983)); see also Ad-Van-
tage Tel. Directories Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 849 F.2d 1336,
1341 (11 th Cir. 1987) (antitrust suit alleging monopoly and attempt to monopo-
lize on part of publisher for soliciting plaintiff's clients).
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Initially the brokers must establish a relevant market in
order to measure the monopoly power of the airline in
question.2 0 0 The two types of relevant markets are the ge-
ographic market, which is the area where products of the
defendant are sold or serviced, and the product market,
which is the economic market in which a particular product
is sold.20 ' The broker should allege a relevant market
small enough to establish the monopoly power of an air-
line. Since FFB coupons are sold both nationally and in-
ternationally, the geographic market is probably too
expansive to conclude that an individual airline possesses
significant monopoly power to lessen competition in the
FFB coupon area.20 2 Thus, the product market is the
most narrowly defined field in which brokers could estab-
lish significant monopoly power regarding the market of
the FFB flyer coupons.
The difficulty with the monopoly claim is that a legiti-
mate market for the frequent flyer coupons does not ex-
ist.20 3  The coupon sales, precluded by tariffs set by
individual airlines, constitute a black market for the
purchase of coupons. 0 4 Courts are reluctant to enforce
antitrust claims against airlines when the relevant product
market is, in fact, a black market.2 0 5
Additionally, the FFB coupons do not constitute a
See Beane, supra note 94, at 1016-17.
2 Id. (emphasis added); see also Ad-Vantage Tel. Directories Consultants, Inc., 849
F.2d at 1341. The relevant product market consists of "those commodities rea-
sonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes." Ad-Vantage Tel.
Directories Consultants,Inc., 849 F.2d at 1341 (citing United States v. DuPont & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1955)).
2-12 See Bliss & Lewis, Overseeing Competition in the Airline Industry: [Vill the Transfer to
justice Make a Difference?, 34 FED. B. NEWS &J. 293, 294 (1987). Even though the
top four airlines control approximately 61% of the market and the top nine con-
trol approximately 94% of the market, the geographic market in terms of selling
tickets (both regular fare and FFB coupon tickets) is too large to determine
whether an individual airline is suppressing competition. Id. at 293-94.
2-":1 See Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1487.
I... d. The tariffs, precluding the transfer or sale of the FFB coupons, forced
brokers to sell the coupons in a "black market." Id.
"-- Id. Since the brokers could not establish a legitimate product market, the
court did not inquire into the relevance of any geographic market. Id.
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"product" such as inventory to be monopolized.0 6 In the
recent case of Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Air-
lines, Inc. ,207 a travel agent sued American because Ameri-
can would not allow the agent to sell American airline
tickets.20 8 American precluded the agent from writing
tickets to customers because the agent would not refrain
from giving airline discounts in violation of American's
tariffs. 20 9 The district court acknowledged that Ameri-
can's policy was essentially a price restraint but held that
the agent did not have standing to sue because of the
agent's failure to identify a product. 2  The court stated
that the airline gives clearance for the agent to sell tickets;
however, the right to sell tickets does not constitute a
transfer of inventory. 2 ' The travel agent "cannot resell
air travel," and the right to sell tickets is not a product
produced and distributed.2t 2 By analogy, a broker, be-
cause of the lack of a legitimate relevant market and a
"product" to sell, would be hard pressed to satisfy the
first element of the monopoly claim against the airlines.
Assuming, however, that a broker can establish a prod-
uct and its relevant market, the next element to establish
would be that the airline maintained its monopoly over
the FFB coupon market willfully, with specific intent, and
caused injury to the competitive market. The airline's
maintenance of monopoly power could be evidenced by
,1,,; See Ad-Vantage Tel. Directories Consultants, Inc., 849 F.2d at 1345. The court of
appeals ruled that yellow page advertisements were not a product transferred to
the advertiser, rather they were "created" by the wholeseller. Id.; Illinois Corpo-
rate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the relationship between travel agents and air carriers).
27 806 F.2d 722 (7th cir. 1986).
2.. Id. at 724. American's airline tariffs specifically prohibited the 10% dis-
counts given to customers by the travel agent. Id.
211 Id.
21-, Id. at 725. The court concluded that the sale of air fares is not analogous to
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the tariffs precluding transfer of the coupons 213 and the
coercive practice of "revoking" tickets from passengers
who purchase the brokered coupons.2 14 The tariffs, how-
ever, are a valid means for the airlines to regulate the rela-
tionship between themselves and passengers but do not
apply to brokers. 21 5 Furthermore, assuming an airline re-
tains monopoly power over a broker, this may be justified
if the airline has valid business reasons not to deal with
the brokers.2 6 Valid reasons for the airlines' refusal to
deal with coupon brokers include the tariff's preclusion of
such dealings, the encouragement of "brand loyalty" by
earning the coupons through the purchase of regular
price tickets, and the loss of revenue when a passenger
using a brokered ticket takes a seat from a full paying
passenger.21 7
The broker could also assert an argument concerning
an attempt by an airline to monopolize the market by ex-
ercising predatory pricing.218 Predatory pricing exists
when a business prices its product below cost in order todrive our competition. 21 9 The practice of offering FFB
coupons free of charge could be so construed. As a
method of foregoing short term profits in order to de-
velop a market position, FFB coupons do not prohibit the
airlines from later raising prices and regaining the cost of
the coupons. 22 0 The airlines, however, could counter this
2-":1 See supra notes 18 and 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of tariff
filing requirements under federal law.
"I See Allen, supra note 1, at 12.
2-1 See supra notes 33-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the validity
of tariff use to regulate the relationship between the airlines and their customers.
,... Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1488; see also Bushie v. Stenocord Corp.,
460 F.2d 116, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1972) (manufacturer may discontinue distribution
to distributor if valid business reasons exist).
'27 Ad-Vantage Tel. Directories Consultants, Inc., 849 F.2d at 1348; Trans World Air-
lines, 682 F. Supp. at 1488.
'" See generally Beane, supra note 94, at 1020-21.
2-19 Id. at 1020.
2211 Seeid. at 1021. But see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S.
574, 588-90 (1986) (predatory pricing is inherently speculative in nature and is
unlikely to occur when the prospects of attaining monopoly power over the rele-
vant market are slight).
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argument by asserting that predatory pricing is an unreal-
istic claim because FFB coupons are not priced and be-
cause control by the airlines of the FFB market is unlikely.
In sum, both the Section one and Section Two antitrust
theories encounter inherent difficulties. Brokers will face
an arduous task in establishing a relevant market,22'
maintaining such market or establishing intent by the air-
lines to monopolize, 22 2 especially in light of court ap-
proval of the airlines' valid business reasons for
precluding the transfer of FFB coupons. 23
VI. CONCLUSION
The airlines' attempts to preclude the brokering of fre-
quent flyer coupons presents a question of first impres-
sion for many courts. In the past there was little need to
address this issue because the brokering of coupons oc-
curred on a small scale. Due to the increasing magnitude
of this business, however, airlines have justifiable eco-
nomic and policy grounds on which to challenge the bro-
kering of FFB coupons.
The tariffs established by the airlines legally govern the
sale or transfer of the coupons. If brokers can establish
that the tariff's purpose is only to insulate the airlines
from antitrust claims, the tariffs should be invalidated.
These tariffs, however, govern the relationship between
the airlines and their passengers and do not have the pur-
pose of circumventing antitrust claims. Furthermore, the
brokers have the difficult task of establishing a legitimate
relevant market and showing harm to that market. These
elements are essential in order to have standing for an an-
titrust claim.
A possible basis for the liability of the brokers is the tort
'-"- See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the diffi-
culties encountered when establishing a relevant market.
222 See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pur-
pose of tariffs and the element of specific intent and maintenance of monopoly
power.
22:1 See Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. at 1488.
1990] 761
762 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
of interfering in the business relationship between the air-
lines and their passengers. This claim is a state specific
action, and the outcome hinges on the applicable state law
where the claim is brought. For instance, California and
Illinois tend to guard business agreements more so than
New York or Texas. Thus, if an airline brought a claim in
California or Illinois they might prevail, while a claim
brought in New York or Texas would be more likely to
fail. The point at which brokering FFB coupons becomes
a tortious interference is not yet clear. The brokers' eco-
nomic interest, however, and the public gain of obtaining
inexpensive air fare certainly mitigates in favor of the
broker.
In sum, it appears that airlines have a strong basis to
prevent the brokering of FFB coupons due to tariff pre-
clusion of such acts. It is unclear, as of yet, the direction
individual states will take regarding the airlines' interfer-
ence with business relation claims against brokers. The
brokers' antitrust claims against the airlines, however, ap-
pear to be uphill battles not likely to be won in the
courtroom.
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